Introduction
Following its devaluation of the peso on December 20, 1994, the Mexican government experienced increasing difficulties in selling its dollar-indexed bonds, tesobonos, at weekly auctions, up until the point that a default seemed inevitable. On January 30, 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton organized a 48.8 billion USD loan package for Mexico with funds from the U.S.
Exchange Stabilization Fund, the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements, and the Bank of Canada. The Clinton bailout of Mexico required the government to pay penalty interest rates on borrowing from this package and to pledge its oil export revenues as collateral. During 1995 and 1996 , the Mexican government reduced spending and increased taxes. The government borrowed less than half of the loans offered, and, as it regained access to credit markets, paid back these loans by January 1997, three years ahead of schedule. The Clinton bailout of Mexico suggests that, by following Bagehot's (1873) dictum of lending freely at a penalty interest rate and on good collateral, an outside party can put an end to a sovereign debt crisis. Starting in 2008, the governments of a number of countries in the Eurozone -notably the PIIGS: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain -have had to pay high spreads over German yields on sales of sovereign bonds, as seen in figure 1. So far, only
Greece has defaulted on its debt. We ask whether the Troika -the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund -can bail out the troubled countries in the Eurozone as President Clinton bailed out Mexico in 1995. Our analysis suggests that debt levels among the PIIGS are so high that it may be too late for such bailouts to be successful in inducing these countries to reduce their debt.
Self-fulfilling debt crises
Our paper builds on the analysis of the debt crises in the Eurozone of Conesa and Kehoe (2012) , which in turn builds on the analysis of the Mexican debt crisis of Kehoe (1996, 2000 
Here ( , ) u c g is the households' concave utility function, which depends on private consumption c and government spending g . The government is benevolent in that shares the same utility function as households. All actors in the model have the same discount factor  . To keep the model simple, we assume that the tax rate  is constant and that there is no private investment.
Lenders are risk neutral and have deep pockets. In particular, they buy the bonds ' B offered for a price ( ', ) q B s that implies the same expected yield 1/ 1   as risk-free bonds:
Let  be the probability that the sunspot variable z takes on a value that tells the international lenders to panic if a crisis would be self-fulfilling. Then,
q B s     if the amount borrowed ' B leaves the government at the risk of a self-fulfilling debt crisis in the next period. That is, ( '( '), ', ( '( '), ')) (1 ) z B s s q B s s    is the probability that the government will repay the debt in the next period.
The possibility of self-fulfilling crises in the Cole-Kehoe and Conesa-Kehoe models depends on the timing of sovereign debt auctions and government decisions to default or not: the sunspot occurs first, then the government offers new bonds ' B at auction, which the bankers buy at price ( ', ) q B s , and then the government decides whether to default or not. The equilibrium outcome is that, if there is an unfavorable realization of the sunspot variable -some bad news that is irrelevant except for its impact on the equilibrium -lenders will not lend to the government if they know that this lack of lending will, in fact, cause the government to default.
If, however, the realization of the sunspot variable is favorable, the lenders lend and no crisis occurs. In this sense, the crisis is self-fulfilling. In the Cole-Kehoe model, the optimal policy for a government when its debt is in the crisis zone is, in general, to run surpluses to reduce the debt to the safe level b -although, if the debt is sufficiently high and if  is sufficiently low, it can be optimal for the government to keep debt constant. Unless the debt is sufficiently close to the safe level b , it is optimal to reduce the debt in a number of steps because the concavity of ( , ) u c g implies that the government wants to smooth its spending.
Gambling for redemption
Since 2008, the governments of the PIIGS have run deficits and increased their levels of debt, as seen in figure 2, even though they have faced high spreads on bond sales, which we interpret as having levels of debt in the crisis zone. To rationalize this behavior -which cannot be optimal in the Cole-Kehoe model -Conesa and Kehoe (2012) introduce recessions into the model. A government of a country that is in a recession has the incentive to borrow to smooth government spending, even though this borrowing puts the country at greater risk of a self-fulfilling crisis.
We refer to this policy of borrowing as gambling for redemption. 
. Government debt in the Eurozone
The state of an economy in every period is now s = ( B,a, z -1 ,z ) , where a = 1 when the country is in normal times and a = 0 when it is in a recession. The country's GDP is now
where 1 0 A > > and 1 A  is the severity of the recession. Let p be the probability that a increases from 0 to 1. In other words, a country in a recession has a low level of GDP Ay and faces a probability p of recovery to the high level of GDP y in the next period. To keep the model simple, we assume that, after a recovery from a recession, the country never enters another recession.
There are now four cutoffs: ( ) b y and ( , ) B y q , where y y  or y Ay  and
The government faces a schedule of bond prices that depend on whether or not the country is in a recession and how much new debt ' B it wants to sell at auction. As the government tries to auction off more new debt, the price it receives falls as this debt ' B crosses cutoffs, as in figure 3 . ; that is, it will sell so much debt that lenders know that the government will repay only if the country recovers and no crisis occurs.
To understand this price schedule, suppose, for example, that the government offers
If the realization of the sunspot variable in the current period is favorable, then lenders will pay
for the bonds: they know that the government will repay for sure if the country recovers, which occurs with probability p , and it will also repay even if the country is still in a recession, which occurs with probability 1 p  , as long as there is no crisis, which occurs with probability 1   .
That is, (
is the probability that the government will repay ' B .
When debt is in the crisis zone during a recession, the government has conflicting incentives. It can reduce its debt to escape the crisis zone so as to reduce the interest that it pays on its debt and eliminate the possibility of incurring the default penalty or it can increase its debt to smooth spending and gamble for redemption. Conesa and Kehoe (2012) find that the optimal government policy depends on the parameters of the model. In particular, the government runs down the debt if interest rates are high ( is large), the costs of default are high (1 Z  is large), the recession is mild (1 A  is small), and the probability of recovery is low ( p is small). On the other hand, in the crisis zone, the government runs up the debt if interest rates are low, the costs of default are low, the recession is severe, and the probability of recovery is high. Furthermore, even for parameter values for which a government chooses to run down its debt if the initial debt is low enough, it can gamble for redemption and run up the debt if the initial debt is high enough.
For high enough levels of initial debt, it is simply too costly to cut spending over a long period of time to try to reach the safe zone of debt.
Bailouts and the role of collateral
We now introduce a fourth actor, the Troika, into the model. Suppose that, with probability it to sell more debt. If its debt is high enough, however, a collateral requirement as part of a bailout is unattractive for the government because it commits the government to do something that it prefers not to do -pay a high interest rate on this debt.
Numerical experiments
We modify the numerical experiment in Conesa and Kehoe (2012) to provide some illustrations of the sorts of results that the model produces. A period is one year, and we model bonds having an average maturity of six years using the specification of Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012):
that is, a fraction of bonds 0.167   needs to be paid every period. Fortunately, this change in the model does not change our basic analysis but makes it possible for the model to produce reasonable results in numerical experiments.
We assume that GDP in normal times is 100 y  . During the recession, GDP falls to (1 ) 
How Can the Eurozone Debt Crises End?
Our model is simplistic along many dimensions and includes simplifying assumptions that are worth relaxing. Nonetheless, using the model as a lens through which to compare the 1994-95
Mexican crisis with the ongoing threat of crises in the Eurozone suggests that there are four ways that the ongoing problems in each of these Eurozone countries can end: First, and most obviously, vigorous economic growth in the country could resume. Second, the government could default and the country could leave the Eurozone. This would allow the country to devalue its real exchange rate and perhaps induce the sort of growth that Mexico experienced after its crisis. Third, the Troika could take over the public finances of the country and force the government to run down the debt, ignoring the incentives to gamble for redemption and gamble for a bailout. Forcing the government to accept a bailout with a high penalty interest rate and a large collateral requirement would be an obvious way to do this. Fourth, the government and households of the country, in their role as voters, could realize that they are significantly poorer than they thought that they would be during the 2000-2008 boom, eliminating much of the incentive to gamble for redemption.
